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KILLING TIME: THE PROCESS OF WAIVING 
APPEAL 
THE MICHAEL ROSS DEATH PENALTY CASES 
 
Stephen Blank∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
At approximately 2:00 am on Friday, May 14, 2005, Michael 
Bruce Ross waited to die. A tense crowd looked on with mixed 
feelings of anticipation, dread, and relief as the executioner 
swabbed Ross’s inside arm with alcohol.1 The attendant then 
readied the lethal injection and asked if Ross had any final words.2 
With eyes clenched Ross merely said, “No, thank you.”3 As the 
chemicals began to course through his veins he gasped for air and 
then shuddered for the last time.4 At 2:25 am, Michael Ross was 
pronounced dead, and so marked the first New England execution 
in 45 years.5 
                                                          
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 
2004. The author wishes to thank his parents, family, and friends for their 
constant support and encouragement.  He would also like to thank the journal 
staff for their guidance, dedication, and  patience. 
1 R. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, (1999), as cited on 
Deathpenaltyinfo.org, Descriptions of Execution Methods, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=479. 
2 Shelly Sindland, Connecticut Serial Killer Put to Death, CNN.com, May 
13, 2005. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 The only execution prior to Ross’s in New England was that of Joseph 
“Mad Dog” Taborsky, on May 17, 1960, for a series of robberies and execution-
style murders. See Michael Bruce Ross: A Compilation of Articles from the 
Hartford Courant and Newsday, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/ 
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The trial and execution of Michael Ross attracted mass-media 
attention and stirred up a host of controversy and intrigue.6 First 
apprehended in the early 1980s, Ross was sentenced to death on 
June 13, 1984 for the rape and murder of four Connecticut girls.7 
After numerous appeals, on September 21, 2004 Ross’s attorney, 
T.R. Paulding Jr., wrote a letter to the trial court indicating that the 
defendant intended to “volunteer” to waive any further appeals or 
collateral attacks on his death sentences, and that he wanted the 
court to set an execution date.8 After 21 years of hearings and 
motions, Michael Ross waived his appeal of the death sentence. 9 
                                                          
html/death/US/ross966.htm. Mr. Ross’s unlikely case pushed Connecticut 
toward its seventy-fourth execution since it adopted capital punishment in 1893. 
Id. 
6 See Sindland, supra note 2; Lynne Tuohy, Ross Ruled Competent; Judge 
Says Serial Killer’s Decision to Waive Appeals and be Executed is ‘Rational 
Choice’, HARTFORD CURRANT, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al; Lynne Tuohy, State 
Supreme Court to Rule on Ross; Week Away From Execution, Justices Weigh 
Appeal Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6, 2005 at B1. 
7 Michael Ross confessed to eight murders in all, four occurring in New 
York. Ross’s criminal behavior began when he was a senior at Cornell 
University. The eight victims, in chronological order were: (1) Ngoc Tu, (2) 17-
year-old Tammy Williams, (3) 16 year-old Paula Perrera, (4) Debra Smith 
Taylor, (5) 19-year-old Robin Stavinsky, (6 & 7) 14-year-olds April Brunais and 
Leslie Shelley, and (8) Wendy Baribeault. The final murder occurred in 1984. 
Witnesses reported seeing a thin, white man with glasses following Baribeault 
on the day she disappeared, and led authorities to Ross. Ross confessed to six of 
the murders, but would only admit to murdering Ngoc Tu and Perrera years 
later. Niall Stanage, Please Kill Me, SUNDAY BUS. POST, Feb. 20, 2005. 
8 The term “volunteering for execution” is borrowed from Richard Strafer, 
Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of 
Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 861 (Fall 1983), 
as quoted in Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An 
Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at 
Certain Stages in Capital Punishment, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75 (2002). The Ross 
court emphasized that the defendant had not “waived” his right to further legal 
proceedings in the sense that he forfeited the ability to exercise that right in the 
future. The parties were in agreement that the defendant could exercise his right 
to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus at any time and that, if he did, the 
execution would be stayed. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 580 (2005). 
9 Awaiting his second penalty phase hearing, Ross indicated that he wanted 
to proceed pro se. Ross, 272 Conn. at 583. A competency evaluation found Ross 
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Defending his decision, Ross stated that he felt that the families of 
his victims had suffered enough.10 
Ross’s attempt to waive his appeal launched his friends, 
family, and opponents of the death penalty into a new sequence of 
litigation and emergency competency hearings.11 In a series of 
subsequent legal actions, Ross’s family and friends argued that 
Ross’s decision was not spurred by a concern for his victims’ 
families, but rather a lack of competency resulting from a host of 
mental illnesses and “Death Row Syndrome.”12 
Ross’s waiver of appeal is not unique.13 Since 1976 there have 
been 885 executions, 106 of which involved “volunteers.”14 In each 
                                                          
competent. Id. The state’s attorney indicated that he would not engage in 
discussions with the defendant unless standby counsel represented him. Id. 
Paulding agreed to take on that role. After extensive negotiations, the defendant 
and the state entered into a stipulation that an aggravating factor existed and no 
mitigating factor existed. Id. The trial court would not allow the stipulation. 
Paulding indicated that the defendant had then contacted him in February 2004 
regarding his desire to waive further proceedings and that they had spoken 
together on numerous occasions over the course of the year. Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. Ross ex rel. Dunham v. Lantz, 408 F.3d 121 (Conn. 2005) (denying 
petitioner, Ross’s sister, ‘next friend’ status); In re Ross, 272 Conn. 674 (2005) 
(denying Ross’s father, Dan Ross, ‘next friend’ status); Ross ex rel. Smyth v. 
Lantz, 396 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that public defender did not have 
‘next friend’ standing prior to proceedings to determine whether defendant was 
incompetent to forgo his right to bring habeas corpus proceedings). 
12 See infra Part II. Death Row Syndrome is a theory that posits that the 
conditions and long stay on death row cause inmates to lose mental competency 
and embrace death as an escape from death row. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER [hereinafter DPIC], Time on Death Row, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397 (last visited Nov. 23, 2005). 
13 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and 
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 940 (2005). 
14 The number 885 is the number of executions until 2003. DPIC, 
Searchable Database of Executions, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
executions.php, as quoted in Blume, supra note 13, at 940. 
 Prior to 1976, capital punishment was deemed unconstitutional. See Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
punishment would be “cruel and unusual” if it was too severe for the crime and 
was arbitrary. Georgia’s death penalty statute, which gave the jury complete 
sentencing discretion, was found unconstitutional and in violation of the Eighth 
BLANK MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:35 PM 
738 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
of these cases, a court must determine whether the inmate is 
competent to understand and appreciate his decision and its 
consequence.15 To this end, the court must scrutinize the facts, 
attributes, and circumstances of the particular inmate.16 While this 
subjective standard allows judges to weed out illegitimate claims 
of incompetency, the standard also gives a judge considerable 
room to manipulate and interpret facts, testimony, and impressions, 
permitting personal biases and beliefs to factor into the decision. 
Through a detailed examination of the Ross case, this 
Comment will argue that the notion of Death Row Syndrome 
complicates the issue of waiving appeal in death penalty cases, and 
that Death Row Syndrome could have been found present in the 
Ross case. In light of growing national and international 
recognition of Death Row Syndrome, the competency test 
currently employed by United States’ courts does not adequately 
consider an inmate’s motivation for “volunteering,” and threatens a 
state’s interest in having a non-arbitrary death penalty. Part I 
                                                          
Amendment. Thus, on June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court effectively voided 40 
death penalty statutes, thereby commuting the sentences of 629 death row 
inmates around the country and suspending the death penalty generally because 
existing statutes were no longer valid. DPIC, History of the Death Penalty Part 
I, Introduction to the Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did=410 (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2005). The first execution since 1976, Gary Gilmore, involved waiver 
of appeal. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1977). See also Blume, supra 
note 13, at 940. 
15 “Whether [one waiving appeal] has capacity to appreciate his position 
and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further 
litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, 
disorder, or defect may substantially affect his capacity.” Rees v. Peyton, 384 
U.S. 312, 314 (1966). See also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 
(1986) (plurality opinion). In Ford v. Wainwright, the court concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment barred the execution of insane prisoners and considered 
whether the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the defendant’s insanity before ruling on the defendant’s petition for 
habeas corpus on the ground that he was insane. Id. See DPIC, Time on Death 
Row, supra note 12. See also Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the Death 
House: Third-Party Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
201, 239 (1994). 
16 McClennan, supra note 15, at 232-33. See also Rees, 384 U.S. at 312. 
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examines the procedural history of the Ross waiver and explores 
the court’s rationale for declaring competency. Part II explores an 
inmate’s possible motivation for waiving appeal, including the 
growing controversy of Death Row Syndrome, and the 
Syndrome’s growing acceptance nationally and internationally. 
Part III describes the current tests and standards for waiving appeal 
and determining competency. Finally, Part IV proposes mandatory, 
non-waivable appeals as a solution to the problems arising from 
waiving appeal in a death penalty case. 
I. MICHAEL ROSS 
This section highlights how the Connecticut courts found Ross 
competent to waive appeal of his death sentence. The first part of 
this section describes the procedural history of the case. The 
second part is divided into three sections. The first of these 
sections highlights the state’s arguments for finding competency. 
The second section presents Ross’s supporters claims for 
incompetency and the final section describes how the court found 
competency by virtually ignoring the testimony of Ross’s 
supporters because they were deemed “biased witnesses.”17 
A. Road to Execution: A Brief Procedural History 
Michael Ross was indicted for eight counts of capital murder.18 
                                                          
17 Ross, 272 Conn. at 684. 
18 The trial court dismissed two counts for lack of territorial jurisdiction 
and, after a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of four counts of capital 
felony in violation of § 53a-54b(5) and two counts of capital felony violation of 
§ 53a-54b(6). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b. 
 The statute defines a capital felony as, among other things, murder by a 
kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before 
such person is able to return or be returned to safety; murder committed in the 
course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; murder of two or 
more persons in the course of a single transaction; murder of a person under 
sixteen years old. 
 The court could only prosecute Ross for the murders that occurred in 
Connecticut, namely Stavinsky, Brunais, Shelley and Baribeault. Ross admitted 
to murdering all four, and raping all but Shelley. Ross later asserted that he did 
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The Superior Court for the district of New London, Connecticut 
found that defendant kidnapped and killed four young girls, and 
sexually assaulted three of them, in a manner that was especially 
cruel, heinous or depraved.19 The trial court imposed the death 
penalty on each of the six counts.20 In 1994, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut determined that certain evidentiary rulings by the trial 
court during the penalty phase impaired Ross’s ability to establish 
a mitigating factor and therefore reversed the imposition of the 
death penalty.21 On remand, a second penalty phase hearing was 
held before a jury that was not swayed by the newly admitted 
evidentiary findings and once more found an aggravating factor for 
each capital felony conviction and no mitigating factor. In 
accordance with the jury’s findings, the court again imposed a 
death sentence.22 
                                                          
not rape Leslie. Stanage, supra note 7. See also State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 
188, 194-95 (1994). 
19 CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-46a(h)(4) instructs the court to impose the 
sentence of death on the defendant if the jury finds that the defendant committed 
the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. See also State v. 
Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 242 (1994).  The Connecticut court interpreted the terms 
“heinous or depraved” to address the defendant’s state of mind in intentionally 
inflicting on his victim extreme pain or torture above and beyond that 
necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. Id. at 261. 
20 Ross, 230 Conn. at 261. 
21 State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 (1994), 646 A.2d 1318, 1364. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. §53a- 46a (2006) permits the presentation of  “any information relevant to 
any mitigating factor.” However, the trial court precluded the defendant from 
submitting to the jury a letter written by Robert Miller, a court appointed 
psychiatric expert who evaluated the defendant for the state and a report by 
Miller, which reflected his corroboration of the diagnosis of the defendant 
contained in the reports of defense psychiatric experts, on the grounds that it was 
not relevant to any mitigating factor and was unauthenticated hearsay and 
unreliable. Ross, 646 A.2d at 1364. 
22 Ross continued to feel that his mental condition should have served as a 
mitigating factor. Stanage, supra note 7. The defendant again appealed the 
sentences to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which affirmed the sentences of 
death. State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648, 665 (2004). See also Ross, 272 Conn. at 
579-80. In Ross’s own words, “I was sentenced to death by a jury because the 
state’s attorney had mocked the defense psychiatric witnesses as both hired guns 
and incompetent fools, while at the same time hiding the fact from the jury that 
his own expert concurred with the defense experts.” Michael P. Ross, prisoner 
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On September 21, 2004, Ross’s lawyers sent a letter to the trial 
judge indicating Ross’s desire to waive appeal of his death 
sentence.23 On December 1, 2004, the public defender’s office, 
which previously represented Ross, filed in the Superior Court a 
motion for permission to appear as next friend of the defendant, 
next friend referring to the ability of a third party to continue 
appeals on the inmate’s behalf.24 Thereafter, the state filed a 
motion seeking a determination as to whether the defendant was 
competent to waive his rights to seek post-conviction relief and 
whether his waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.25 
The public defender’s office alleged in its motion that it had 
standing to appear as the defendant’s next friend because the 
defendant was incompetent when he terminated the public 
defenders’ representation.26 In addition to the motion for 
permission to appear, the public defender’s office filed a motion to 
stay Ross’s execution pending a judicial determination as to 
whether the defendant was competent to waive appeal.27 
At a December 9, 2004 hearing, the court ordered that the 
defendant undergo a competency examination.28 In addition, a 
hearing on the public defenders’ motion to appear on behalf of the 
defendant was scheduled to occur before that examination.29 At 
that hearing, the court denied the next friend motion but noted that 
                                                          
#127404, Why I Choose Death Rather than to Fight for Life [hereinafter Ross, 
Why I Choose Death], http://www.ccadp.org/michaelross-whyichoose.htm. 
23 State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 656 (Conn. 2005). 
24 At the same time that the Public Defender’s office was motioning to 
appear as next friend of the defendant, they simultaneously filed a motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis and a petition for writ of certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court. The public defender’s office represented in the filings 
that the defendant had refused to sign an affidavit of indigence in support of the 
motion because he was incompetent. The United States Supreme Court denied 
the motion on January 10, 2005. Id. at 657. Next friend standing is defined in 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
25 State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 135 (Conn. 2005). 
26 State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 657 (Conn. 2005). 
27 Id. 
28 The competency examination was to be done by Michael Norko, a 
psychiatrist. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 587 (2005). 
29 Id. 
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if the defendant were shown to be incompetent at a later date, the 
court would reconsider its decision.30 
At the competency hearing that followed, the court found Ross 
competent.31 The public defender’s office claimed it possessed 
evidence, independent of the court-ordered evaluation, to prove 
Ross’s incompetence.32 The evidence presented at these 
competency hearings are the facts eventually considered by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court in deciding this case. 
B. Michael Ross: Competent 
1. The Evidence of Competency 
The Court’s finding of competency was based upon Ross’s 
examination by psychiatrist Michael Norko.33 At the competency 
                                                          
30 Id. at 588. 
31 Id. at 591. 
32 The court then issued an order authorizing the public defender’s office to 
file with the court a written offer of proof detailing the evidence that it would 
present at a competency hearing. 
 The public defender’s office filed an offer of proof, attaching summaries of 
its witnesses. The list included summaries of the proposed testimony of Stuart 
Grassian, a psychiatrist; Eric Goldsmith, a psychiatrist; five attorneys with the 
public defender’s office: Barry Butler, Karen Goodrow, Paula Montonye, 
Lauren Weisfeld and John Holdridge; Robert Nave, state death penalty abolition 
coordinator for the Connecticut branch of Amnesty International and executive 
director of the Connecticut Network to abolish the death penalty; and Dan Ross, 
the defendant’s father. 
State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 690-91 (2005). 
33 After the initial competency hearing on December 9, 2004, the court 
decided that it needed an expert opinion. The court ordered the defendant to 
undergo a competency examination by Michael Norko and scheduled a 
competency hearing for December 28, 2004. Norko first evaluated Ross’s 
competency in 1995, but had no contact with him between 1995 and his meeting 
with Ross on December 15, 2004. On December 15, 2004 Norko met with Ross 
for approximately three hours. He also spoke with two psychologists, a 
psychiatric social worker and a psychiatrist, all of whom had known Ross for 
many years. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 591 (2005). 
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hearing, Norko testified that Ross could make a rational decision.34 
Norko found that Ross “had an excellent understanding of his legal 
position and the ramifications of his decision to forgo any further 
legal proceedings.”35 Norko did not believe that Ross was trying to 
kill himself.36 Rather, Norko believed that Ross’s decision was 
“based on [Ross’s] belief that it would be morally wrong to subject 
the families of his victims to the pain that would be caused by 
proceedings that could go on for years.”37 
Norko’s evaluation found that Ross did not suffer from clinical 
depression.38 Norko supported this assertion by pointing out that 
Ross was sleeping well, had a normal appetite and a good energy 
level.39 Norko determined that Ross was able to concentrate and 
process thoughts, had no memory disturbances and expressed no 
suicidal thoughts, despite a past history of suicide attempts.40 
Norko did find that Ross was occasionally emotional, but he 
credited that to the reality of facing execution.41 
Norko was next asked to determine whether any of Ross’s 
mental ailments affected his decision-making.42 Norko stated that 
Ross suffered from several mental diseases, including: “a 
depressive disorder not otherwise specified,” sexual sadism, 
possibly “an anxiety disorder not otherwise specified,” and a 
personality disorder with narcissistic, borderline and antisocial 
traits. 43 Ross was treated for those ailments while in prison, and 
                                                          
34 Id. at 587. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 593. 
37 Id. at 589. 
38 Id. 
39 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 589 (2005). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 587. 
43 A depressive disorder not otherwise specified is a disorder with 
depressive characteristics, but which does not meet the criteria for major 
depression. Id. at 590. Norko’s diagnosis of sexual sadism was based on the 
reports of other psychiatrists. Id. at 589. Personality disorder with narcissistic, 
borderline and antisocial traits or a full blown narcissistic personality disorder 
with borderline and antisocial traits is an Axis II disorder according to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition (DSM-
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took Depo-Lupron to reduce his sex drive, and Klonopin and 
Wellbutrin, which are anti-anxiety medications. Ross also took 
Vistaril, an anti-anxiety medication, on an as-needed basis.44 
Norko argued that any detrimental affects the diseases may have 
had on Ross’s decision-making capacity were counteracted by the 
prescribed medications.45 Furthermore, in Norko’s professional 
opinion, the different medications probably improved Ross’s 
ability to make decisions rather than interfered.46 
Norko’s analysis runs counter to Ross’s own assertions about 
his mental condition and subsequent effect of his medications on 
his decision-making process.47 Ross wrote that: 
I was under the control of a mental illness. That monster 
lives in my head and it will always be there, somewhere 
hidden away in my mind. But that monster is not me. I was 
never really sure of that, even during my original trial, 
because that monster in my mind was so intertwined with 
who I was that even I had trouble making the distinction 
between it and me. It was only about three years after I 
went to death row, after I finally received approval for my 
medicationfirst weekly injections of Depo-Provera, and 
now monthly injections of Depo-Lupron that the monster in 
my mind started to lose its power and control over me and I 
was finally able to begin to see what it really was; who I 
really was; and what the difference was between that 
monster and myself.48 
                                                          
IV). According to the experts’ testimony, opinions can differ as to whether one 
has enough of the traits listed in a disorder in the DSM-IV to qualify as an actual 
disorder. For example, Norko opined that Ross only had some narcissistic traits 
as part of a general personality disorder, while Gentile concluded that Ross had 
enough of those traits to qualify for a full-blown narcissistic personality disorder 
diagnosis. There is no substantial difference. See Ross Competency Ruling 
Analysis, A Public Defender: Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, http://publicdefender.typepad.com/public_ 
defender_blog/2005/04/ross_competency.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2005). 
44 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 583 (2005). 
45 Id. at 590. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 591. 
48 Ross, Why I Choose Death, supra note 22. 
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Despite “the monster losing power,” Ross later admitted on direct 
testimony that he continued to take Vistaril on an as-needed basis 
when he experienced episodes of intense anxiety and believed that 
he should not make important decisions during those moments of 
heightened anxiety.49 Despite these discrepancies, Norko testified 
in his report that Ross’s motivation for waiving appeal was to save 
his victims’ families further pain.50 
The court’s report contains discrepancies that challenge Ross’s 
alleged motivation.51 For instance, at the hearing, Ross testified 
that he had occasional doubts about whether his execution would 
end the pain of the victims’ families. He also testified that he 
would accept a sentence of life imprisonment immediately if it 
were offered.52 
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court 
accepted Norko’s evaluation and found Ross competent within the 
meaning of Rees.53 The court found that Ross was: 
[n]ot making his decision on the basis of any threats, 
promises or coercion; he was lucid, educated, intelligent, 
insightful, knowledgeable, firm in his decision and 
understanding of the questions posed to him; had a grasp of 
the legal issues involved and was aware of his legal 
options; none of the medications taken by the defendant 
have affected his ability to understand the proceedings or to 
make rational decisions; the defendant is not motivated by 
a desire to commit suicide, but by concern for the victims’ 
families; and the defendant has the capacity to understand 
his choices.54 
This explanation focused on Ross’s cognitive ability to 
understand the decision. The court found the decision to be Ross’s 
own, and held that he could understand the consequences and 
                                                          
49 Ross did note that the episodes of heightened anxiety were brief. Ross, 
272 Conn. at 590. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 590-95. 
52 Id. at 595. 
53 Id. at 591. 
54 Id. 
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make rational choices.55 
2. Arguments of Ross’s Supporters 
At the rehearing in the Superior Court of Connecticut, the 
public defender’s office represented that it had evidence of Ross’s 
incompetence that had not been presented to any court.56 This 
evidence was presented at further competency hearings in April 
2005.57 While the Superior Court initially heard the evidence, its 
decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
At the April 2005 hearings, the court heard from Dan Ross, 
Ross’s father, Norko, and psychiatrists Stuart Grassian, Eric 
Goldsmith, and Suzanne Gentile.58 The depositions of Martha 
Elliot, a journalist and friend, and Susan P., the defendant’s 
girlfriend, were also read into the record.59 Ross’s supporters 
argued that Ross’s decision to waive appeal was involuntary and 
also that Ross’s decision was motivated by a desire to commit 
suicide.60 Psychiatrist Stewart Grassian argued that “prisoners held 
in segregated confinement frequently develop mental 
disturbances.”61 Grassian went on to note that “these disturbances 
can affect the prisoners’ ability to assist in their own defense; 
living under sentence of death can cause an overwhelming sense of 
helplessness and fear resulting in a desperate need to regain control 
by waiving further challenges to the death sentence.”62 The 
conditions of Ross’s confinement may have exacerbated his pre-
existing mental illnesses and resulted in suicidal ideation.63 
Grassian testified that Ross’s personality disorder and 
                                                          
55 Id. at 609-11. 
56 State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 690 (2005). 
57 Id. at 696. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 593 (2005). 
61 These mental disturbances include impaired alertness, attention and 
concentration, hyperresponsiveness to stimuli, withdrawal, obsessive 
preoccupation with trivial matters, sleep disturbances and psychotic delirium. Id. 
62 Id. at 593. 
63 Id. 
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narcissism had rendered his decision to volunteer involuntary.64 
While Norko and Gentile testified that Ross’s narcissism had no 
substantial effect on his ability to make rational choices, Grassian 
and Goldsmith believed that Ross’s narcissism made it impossible 
for Ross to bear the perceived humiliation of backing down from 
his decision to volunteer.65 Grassian and Goldsmith identified 
several narcissistic traits, including: grandiosity, inability to 
empathize, self-centeredness and arrogance.66 These elements 
compelled Ross to posture as a good and noble person, who was 
waiving appeal to spare his victims’ families further pain, when in 
reality, Ross was motivated by narcissism. 67 
This argument was supported by the testimony of Ross’s own 
father.68 Dan Ross stated that Michael Ross was extremely 
narcissistic and “not unlike a child before the age of reason.”69 He 
testified that Ross reveled in the attention that being a martyr 
brings, and therefore had an ulterior motive to proceed with his 
execution.70 
Grassian and Goldsmith argue that Ross had an ulterior motive 
which they inferred from his attributes and actions.71 The core of 
their argument was that Norko failed to recognize that the 
defendant’s intelligence would make it possible for him to conceal 
his “hidden agenda.”72 Grassian argued that Norko did not 
recognize Ross’s intelligence and thus failed to properly scrutinize 
Ross’s words and actions.73 Through analyzing Ross’s words and 
actions, Grassian found Ross incompetent to make a rational 
                                                          
64 State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 697 (2005). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 595 (2005). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 595-96. 
71 Norko specifically stated that in the past, Ross “has hidden things from 
the prison’s mental health staff.” Id. at 594. Ross was extremely intelligent and 
graduated from Cornell University. Pat Eaton, After 45 Years, a U.S. State 
Executes Eight-time Killer, THE ADVERTISER, May 14, 2005, at 60. 
72 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 594 (2005). 
73 Id. at 593. 
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decision because his decision to waive appeal was arguably 
uncontrollable and motivated by Ross’s narcissism.74 
There were two distinct instances to which Grassian called the 
court’s attention. The first was when Ross was quoted as stating 
that the other prisoners on death row were brutal murderers who 
took no responsibility for their crimes and engaged in bravado and 
grandstanding, while he had the “real guts” to go forward with his 
execution.75 Garison believed that this undermined the claim that 
Ross was motivated by consideration for his victims’ families. 
The second piece of evidence is a letter, written by Ross to 
Martha Elliott, a journalist.76 The letter indicated that Ross’s 
decision was driven more by a desire to end his own pain than by 
concern for the families of his victims, and that Ross knew that he 
could not say that publicly.77 The letter explicitly states that Ross 
believed he suffered from “Death Row Syndrome,” which is the 
theory that a prolonged duration on death row creates depression in 
inmates and encourages inmates to seek death as an escape from 
death row.78 Grassian suggests that Ross became incapable of 
bearing his distress and despair, and that suicidal ideation was a 
result of his time and conditions on death row, leading to his 
ultimate decision to volunteer.79 
3. Competency Ruling 
At the competency hearing, the court found Ross competent to 
waive appeal and found the analyses of Norko and Gentile more 
credible than the expert testimony of Grassian and Goldsmith and 
the opinions of Dan Ross, Susan P., and Martha Elliot.80 The court 
concluded that Grassian’s proposed testimony concerning the 
effect of segregated confinement on the defendant’s ability to 
                                                          
74 Id. at 663-64. 
75 Id. at 664. 
76 Id. at 663. 
77 Id. 
78 State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 139 n.8 (Conn. 2005). 
79 Id. at 138 n.6. 
80 Id. at 140. 
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make a rational and voluntary choice was speculative.81 However, 
the court determined that Ross did have some symptoms of 
depression, possibly caused by the isolation and prolonged stay on 
death row.82 
The court also held that the testimony of Dan Ross, Susan P., 
and Martha Elliot was unpersuasive because they were biased 
witnesses.83 The court disregarded the opinions of Dan Ross, 
Susan P, and Martha Elliot, because these witnesses were 
“opposed to the death penalty in general, are close friends or 
family of the [defendant], and do not personally support his 
decision to die.”84 Ross’s supporters argue that the court never 
fully inquired into Ross’s possible suicidal tendencies or whether 
one of Ross’s mental illnesses could have affected his decision-
making capability. After listening to all the testimony, the court put 
more weight on Norko’s testimony than that of Ross’s supporters 
and opted not to address the issue of Death Row Syndrome in its 
opinion. 
II. DEATH ROW SYNDROME 
In the Ross case, Ross indicated that he was isolated for 
twenty-two or twenty-three hours a day, found the conditions of 
his confinement intolerable, felt helpless and out of control, and 
had a tendency toward obsessive thoughts.85 These symptoms have 
all been associated with Death Row Syndrome.86 Death Row 
Syndrome is the theory that the mental stress of prolonged 
exposure to death row can cause incompetency in inmates.87 
International courts first recognized the notion of Death Row 
                                                          
81 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 610-11 (2005). In his report, Norko found 
that the defendant had frequent visitors, corresponded with numerous people and 
regularly prayed, read, listened to music, watched television and did puzzles and 
word games. Id. at 610. 
82 State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 696-97 (2005). 
83 Ross, 273 Conn. at 684. 
84 Id. 
85 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 663-64 (2005). 
86 DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. 
87 Id. 
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Syndrome in Soering v. United Kingdom,88 but actually identified 
examples of the syndrome in Pratt v. Attorney General for 
Jamaica and Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica.89 United States judges 
and courts, however, have been reluctant to agree with the 
international courts regarding the pervasiveness of Death Row 
Syndrome. 
A. Death Row Syndrome Generally: Why an Inmate May Waive 
Appeal 
Many factors may lead an inmate to waive appeal of his death 
sentence. These factors can run parallel or counter to the state’s 
overriding interest in preserving life and preventing suicide.90 In 
some cases, inmates do not truly want to die, but waive appeal and 
expedite their death sentence because they accept the finality of 
their punishment.91 In other cases, inmates may waive appeal 
                                                          
88 11. Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439 (1989). 
89 Pratt and Morgan were combined death penalty cases. Pratt v. Att’y Gen. 
for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 22, cited in Natalia Schifrin, Current 
Development: Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition Under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 A.J.I.L. 563, 565 
(1998); Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987 
(views adopted Apr. 7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986 
cited in Schifrin, supra, at 565. 
90 See Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 811 (Okla. 1993) (Chapel, J., specially 
concurring) (stating that the state has a strong interest in preventing defendants 
from manipulating the justice system; “the State must not become an unwitting 
partner in a defendant’s suicide.”) as quoted in McClellan, supra note 15, at 
211. The state has an interest in preserving life; for example, if a death-row 
inmate goes on a hunger strike, Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations allow the 
inmate to be force-fed. McClellan, supra note 15, at 211. 
91 For example, in Comer v. Stewart, Ronald Charles Comer waived appeal 
of the death penalty and accepted his punishment. Upon examination, Comer 
was told that he had a good chance of getting a new trial, having his sentence 
mitigated to life imprisonment or at least substantially delaying his execution. 
However, Comer replied, “I did it” and refused to prolong his punishment on 
procedural grounds. Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1061 (D. Ariz. 
2002). See also State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 653 (2005). See Mathew T. 
Norman, Standards and Procedures for Determining Whether a Defendant is 
Competent to Make the Ultimate ChoiceDeath; Ohio’s New Precedent for 
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because of Death Row Syndrome: depression caused by extended 
tenure and conditions on death row.92 
The easiest scenario for a court is when an inmate waives 
appeal to accept the finality of his punishment.93 In such a 
situation, the inmate does not necessarily want to die, but rather 
takes responsibility for his or her actions. For example, in 1997, 
Scott Dawn Carpenter expedited his death sentence because he felt 
that the punishment fit his crime.94 Carpenter was convicted of 
murdering a store clerk in 1994.95 After the conviction, he sent a 
letter to the Oklahoma Supreme Court explaining why he wanted 
to waive appeal, stating, “I have never claimed innocence to the 
crime I committed, was charged with and found guilty of murder. 
The State affirmed their decision on the first step in the appellate 
process, and I feel and want the punishment of death carried out as 
soon as possible.”96 At the subsequent competency hearing, 
Carpenter defended his choice, indicating that the best he could 
hope for was commutation to life in prison and that he saw no 
future in spending sixty or seventy years locked up.97 Content that 
his decision was motivated by acceptance of his punishment, the 
court found Carpenter competent.98 
                                                          
Death Row “Volunteers,” 13 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 113-16 (1998-1999). 
92 Norman, supra note 91, at 113-16. An example of an inmate waiving 
appeal because of depression is Don Jay Miller, in Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 
1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 2000). Miller allegedly waived appeal because he 
became incompetent on death row. Miller first contested his death penalty 
sentence, but later decided to waive appeal. Experts in the case noted that 
Miller’s history of physical, psychological and sexual abuse as a child make him 
highly susceptible to the effects of physical isolation on death row, which could 
cause psychological decompensation to the point of becoming incompetent. 
Miller, 231 F.3d at 1251-52. See also Ross, 272 Conn. 577. 
93 McClellan, supra note 15, at 211. 
94 Norman, supra note 91, at 113, citing Jean Pagel, Slain Man’s Hopes for 
Answers Before Execution, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 7, 1997, at 01. 
95 Norman, supra note 91, at 113. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 114. 
98 Carpenter was executed by lethal injection five months later. Id. at 113-
14. See also id. at 114, quoting Michael Graczyk, Texas Executes Convicted 
Killer Benjamin Stone, AUSTIN- AMERICAN STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 1997, at B4 
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In some cases, an inmate’s impetus for waiving appeal 
conflicts with a state’s interest in preserving life and preventing 
suicide. Opponents of capital punishment point to numerous 
studies citing Death Row Syndrome or “Death Row Phenomenon” 
as depression caused by being on death row for many years 
causing inmates to waive appeal.99 Death Row Syndrome and 
Death Row Phenomenon are legal terms, not clinical ones.100 The 
American Psychiatric Association does not recognize Death Row 
Syndrome or Death Row Phenomenon.101 
When the United States Constitution was written, the time 
between sentencing and execution could be measured in days or 
weeks.102 In the wake of the Supreme Court-mandated suspension 
of the death penalty from 1972 to 1976, numerous reforms have 
been introduced to create a less arbitrary system, arbitrary referring 
to ensuring that the process used to convict an inmate to death is 
accurate and thorough.103 This has resulted in lengthier appeals, as 
mandatory sentencing reviews have become the norm, and 
continual changes in laws and technology have necessitated 
reexamination of individual sentences.104Today, death row inmates 
live in a state of constant uncertainty over when they will be 
executed. For some inmates this isolation and anxiety results in a 
sharp deterioration of their mental capacity and a desire to end the 
agony of each new day in prison.105 Death row inmates typically 
                                                          
(discussing a 1997 case where a court permitted Benjamin Stone to expedite his 
death sentence after killing his wife and stepdaughter because Stone rationalized 
that, “I’m not appealing anything, what’s the point? I’m guilty. I feel like I’m 
doing the right thing. Why prolong it? . . . As far as I’m concerned, it’s the only 
way I’ll find peace of mind.”). 
99 Strafer, supra note 8, at 869. 
100 David Wallace-Wells, What is Death Row Syndrome? And Who Came 
Up With It?, Feb. 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2112901/. 
101 Death Row Syndrome is also unrecognized in the American Psychiatric 
Association handbook and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders. Id. 
102 DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. 
103 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); DPIC, Time on Death Row, 
supra note 12. 
104 DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. 
105 Id. 
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spend over a decade awaiting execution; some prisoners having 
been on death row for well over twenty years.106 During this time 
the inmates are generally isolated from other prisoners, excluded 
from prison educational and employment programs, and sharply 
restricted in terms of visitation and exercise, spending as many as 
twenty-three hours a day alone in their cells.107 These conditions 
have prompted innocent and guilty inmates to waive appeal and 
raises the question of whether death row prisoners are receiving 
two distinct punishments: the death sentence itself, and the years of 
living in conditions tantamount to solitary confinement.108 
B. Death Row Syndrome in International Courts 
International courts first identified the existence of Death Row 
Syndrome. In fact, the term was first coined during extradition 
hearings in the United Kingdom for Jen Soering.109 Soering was a 
German citizen who was arrested in England and charged with 
committing murders in Virginia in 1985.110 Soering argued to the 
European Court of Human Rights that the conditions he would face 
during the lengthy period between sentencing and execution would 
be as psychologically damaging as torture.111 Soering presented 
evidence that the prison conditions at Mecklenburg Correctional 
Center, where the majority of Virginia’s death row prisoners were 
interned, were unduly harsh, and he submitted evidence as to the 
“extreme stress, psychological deterioration and risk of 
                                                          
106 Strafer, supra note 8, at 869-70. See also DPIC, Time on Death Row, 
supra note 12; State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 659 (2005); 272 Conn. 577, 585 
(2005). Ross spent twenty years on death row. Id. 
107 DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. 
108 Some have argued that an innocent person would never seek execution, 
but at least one such person, Isidore Zimmerman, willingly sought execution 
because of the intense psychological torture of being on death row. Zimmerman 
was later exonerated. Strafer, supra note 8, at 869 as found in McClellan, supra 
note 15, at 211. 
109 A psychologist in the extradition of Soering first coined the term “death 
row phenomenon.” Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. 439 
(1989). 
110 Wallace-Wells, supra note 100. 
111 Id. See also Soering, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev. at 439. 
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homosexual abuse and physical attack undergone by prisoners on 
death row.”112 
The court recognized that the Council of Europe abolished the 
death penalty in times of peace and stressed that the “condemned 
prisoner must for many years endure the conditions on death row 
and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present 
shadow of death.”113 The court went on to note how prisoners who 
utilize the appeals process can be placed in the “death house” 
awaiting imminent execution several times during incarceration.114 
It was the inability to know when death would come that qualified 
the long wait for the death penalty as a cruel and unusual penalty 
under the European Convention.115 Citing the possibility of 
Soering developing Death Row Syndrome as justification for its 
ruling, the court found that under the European Convention, 
Soering could not be sentenced to death under the current prison 
conditions.116 
The Soering case identified the possibility of Death Row 
Syndrome, but in the Pratt and Morgan cases in 1993, Jamaica’s 
court of last resort, the London-based Judicial Committee on the 
Privy Council, was confronted with actual examples of Death Row 
Syndrome.117 Pratt and Morgan had been convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death in January 1979.118 They were held on death 
row for fourteen years.119 Three times, their death warrants were 
read to them and they were placed in condemned cells adjacent to 
the gallows.120 Several appeals were made over the years  and 
                                                          
112 Ed Morgan, On Art and the Death Penalty: Invitation to a Beheading, 
15 CARDOZO STUD. L & LIT. 279, 283-84 (2003). 
113 Id. (quoting Soering, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rev., at n. 5 para. 106). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. See DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. See also Wallace-
Wells, supra note 100. 
117 Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 22; Pratt 
and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987 (views 
adopted Apr. 7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986. 
118 Schifrin, supra note 89, at 565. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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delays occurred throughout the process.121 The British court found 
that it was “inhuman and degrading” to hang anyone who had 
spent more than five years on death row.122 The court ruled that 
such prisoners must have their death sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment.123 
Despite the Soering and Pratt and Morgan rulings, no 
uniformity currently exists among foreign courts that have 
considered the issue of Death Row Syndrome. For instance, in 
Kindler v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that 
extraditing a convicted capital fugitive to the United States, where 
the defendant would possibly be subject to Death Row 
Phenomenon, did not violate Canadian Law.124 In contrast to 
Soering, the Canadian court did not refuse extradition based upon 
Death Row Syndrome.125 However, the Canadian court 
acknowledged the existence of Death Row Syndrome and arguably 
strengthened the validity, scope, and influence of the  Syndrome.126 
Foreign courts vary as to the definition, application, and 
treatment of Death Row Syndrome. For instance, the court in Pratt 
and Morgan v. Jamaica considered the specific facts of the case 
but then determined that more than five years on death row 
essentially resulted in Death Row Syndrome per se.127 In contrast, 
the court in Soering based its holding on an analysis of particular 
                                                          
121 One such delay occurred when legal papers were put in the wrong 
bundle and forgotten. Earl Pratt and Another Appellant v. Attorney General for 
Jamaica and Another Respondents, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 1993 WL 963003, at *22 
(P.C.) (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica). 
122 Id. at *35. 
123 Id. at *35-36. “This resulted in the commutation of scores of death 
sentences in Jamaica, Bermuda, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, cutting the 
death row population of English-speaking Caribbean nations by more than half.” 
DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12 (citing Don Bohning, Convicts Face 
Faster Trip to the Gallows; Caribbean Irked at Legal Delays, MIAMI HERALD, 
Sept. 8, 1998, at 1A.) 
124 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779. See also Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991, 
reported at 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 307 (1993). 
125 Kindler,  2 S.C.R. 779. 
126 Id. 
127 Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987 
(views adopted Apr. 7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986. 
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facts.128 However, despite these variations in the diagnosis and 
application of Death Row Syndrome, international courts have, at a 
minimum, acknowledged the detrimental effects that extended 
stays on death row can have on an inmate. 
C. The United States Death Penalty, the Eighth Amendment, 
and Death Row Syndrome 
The United States death penalty has a long and controversial 
history concerning whether the death penalty is unconstitutional as 
“cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. 
This section begins with Furman v. Georgia to show the Supreme 
Court’s initial stance on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.129 This section then addresses Ropper v. Simmons and 
how the Court has recently looked toward international courts for 
guidance on interpreting the Eighth Amendment in death penalty 
cases.130 Finally, in the wake of growing international recognition 
of Death Row Syndrome, this section shows how some Supreme 
Court Justices and state courts have acknowledged the possible 
unconstitutionality of prolonged exposure to death row.131 
In the United States, beginning in the 1960s, it was suggested 
that the death penalty was a “cruel and unusual punishment” that 
violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.132 In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court 
set the standard that a punishment would be “cruel and unusual” if 
                                                          
128 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989). See 
contra Kindler v. Canada, [1991] S.C.R. 779. 
129 Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. 
130 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198. 
131 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting the 
denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from a denial of certiorari); Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 
1999). 
132 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). This 
rationale evolved from Trop v. Dulles, which stated that the Eighth Amendment 
contained an “evolving standard of decency that marked the progress of a 
maturing society.” 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See also DPIC, History of the Death 
Penalty Part I, supra note 14. 
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it was too severe for the crime, if it was arbitrary, if it offended 
society’s sense of justice, or it if was not more effective than a less 
severe penalty.133 Furman was a direct challenge to a death 
sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, and resulted in the 
voiding of forty different state death penalty statutes.134 The 
holding in Furman was that specific death penalty statutes were 
unconstitutional because they were “arbitrary.”135 The Court 
opened the door for states to rewrite their death penalty statutes to 
eliminate the problems cited in Furman.136 Soon, thirty-seven 
states enacted revised death penalty statutes.137 
In the wake of European recognition of Death Row Syndrome, 
there remains an argument that prolonged tenure on death row may 
violate the Eighth Amendment,138 and in recent years the Supreme 
Court has looked to international courts when interpreting the 
Eighth amendment.139 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the 
death penalty on juvenile offenders.140 The court observed the 
“stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world 
that continued to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty.”141 This case shows the suggestive impact and influence 
of international standards and law on United States jurisprudence, 
especially concerning the Eighth Amendment.142 
The issue of the constitutionality of a long stay on death row 
                                                          
133 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See also DPIC, History of Death Penalty Part I, 
supra note 14. 
134 DPIC, History of Death Penalty Part I, supra note 14. 
135 However, Justices Brennan and Marshall felt that the death penalty 
itself, as a punishment, was unconstitutional. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272, 275 
(Brennan, J. concurring); Id. at 358 (Marshall, J., concurring); Lackey, 514 U.S. 
at 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
136 DPIC, History of Death Penalty Part I, supra note 14. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. See also Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) (refusing to find 
the death penalty unconstitutional). 
139 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
140 Lackey, 520 U.S. at 1198 (juvenile defined as under the age of 18). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
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was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Lackey v. Texas.143 
The case involved Clarence Lackey, who had spent seventeen 
years on death row when he petitioned the Supreme Court to 
decide whether such an extensive confinement constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.144 
While the Court denied certiorari to hear Lackey, Justice John 
Paul Stevens wrote an accompanying opinion to the denial, which 
questioned the constitutionality of the long delays between 
sentencing and execution.145 Justice Stevens argued in the 
memorandum that the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 
rested on its serving two principal societal purposes: retribution 
and deterrence. In his view, “It is arguable that neither ground 
retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under 
a sentence of death.”146 
Similarly, in his dissent in the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear 
Elledge v. Florida, Justice Stephen Breyer noted that Elledge’s 
argument that twenty-three years under a sentence of death is 
unusual and “especially cruel” was worth considering.147 Breyer 
wrote that “after such a delay, an execution may well cease to 
serve the legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a 
necessary constitutional justification for the death penalty.”148 In 
light of growing international concerns, Justice Breyer further 
noted that “British jurists have suggested that the Bill of Rights of 
1689, a document relevant to the interpretation of our own 
Constitution, may forbid, as cruel and unusual, significantly lesser 
delays.”149 
The Florida and New Jersey state courts have held that 
prolonged tenure on death row can amount to cruel and unusual 
                                                          
143 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045. 
144 Id. See also Lackey, 520 U.S. at 1183. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. (Stevens, J. respecting the denial of certiorari). 
147 Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting from a denial of 
certiorari). 
148 Id.; Elledge v. Florida, 142 L. Ed. 2d 303, 304 (U.S. 1998) Breyer, J., 
dissenting from a denial of cert.). 
149 Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944. 
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punishment.150 In Jones v. State, the Florida state courts tried and 
convicted Ronnie Jones of first-degree murder, and sentenced him 
to death in 1981.151 In 1985, on appeal, Jones claimed that he was 
incompetent at the time of his trial.152 The Supreme Court of 
Florida ordered the trial court to hold a competency hearing, which 
the trial court failed to conduct until 1997.153 In 1999, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that it could not “accept any excuse or have 
any tolerance for the state placing a person on death row and 
allowing a person to linger there for the period of time, or even 
near the period of time, that has occurred in this case.”154 Jones’s 
due process rights were impacted by the twelve-year delay in 
holding the competency hearing, and it was impossible to give him 
a retrospective competency determination that complied with due 
process.155 
In New Jersey, Judge Reginald Stanton sentenced Thomas J. 
Koskovich to death for his role in the ambush and murder of two 
men in 1997, but only if the execution was carried out in five 
years.156 The judge criticized the nation’s courts for delays in 
                                                          
150 Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 1999); Robert Hanley, Judge 
Orders Death Penalty With a Five-Year Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at 
B5. 
151 Jones, 740 So. 2d at 521. Jones attached affidavits from psychologists 
and from lawyers who represented him at various stages of the trial who 
affirmed that appellant seemed incompetent. Id. at 522. 
152 Id. 
153 In 1995, Jones filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief. “The 
trial court then ordered an evidentiary hearing on the original competency 
issue.” Id. 
154 Id. at 526. 
155 Id. at 523-24. 
156 If the state did not carry out the execution by May 7, 2004, the judge 
ordered that the sentence automatically be changed to life in prison. DPIC, 
International Perspective on the Death Penalty, supra note 64, citing Hanley, 
supra note 149. Koskovich lured two deliverymen to an abandoned house in 
Franklin, New Jersey, through a false order for two pizzas, and then murdered 
them. Id. As of 2002, the state Supreme Court upheld the convictions but found 
that Stanton’s instructions to the jury in the penalty phase could have unfairly 
swayed its decision to impose the death penalty against Koskovich. Jury 
selection for a new penalty phase was set to start September 9, 2002. Mary P. 
Gallagher, New Jersey Defenders, AG Seeks Freeze of Capital Case, National 
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executions, noting that “the process has become unacceptably cruel 
to defendants . . . who spend long years under sentence of death 
while the judicial system conducts seemingly interminable 
proceedings which remind many observers of a cruelly whimsical 
cat toying with a mouse.”157 Judge Stanton went on to mention that 
in capital cases around the country, an average of ten years elapses 
between the date of sentence and execution and that “if we [the 
United States] are to have a death penalty, then we should have the 
skill, the courage, and the decency to carry out the death sentence 
in a reasonably expeditious manner.”158 
In both Florida and New Jersey, the respective state courts 
identified conditions amounting to Death Row Syndrome.159 While 
never explicitly citing Death Row Syndrome, the courts recognized 
the potential psychological consequences of extended stays on 
death row.160 In light of growing national and international concern 
and criticism over the death penalty and the Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgment of international perspectives concerning the death 
penalty and the Eighth Amendment in Ropper, mandatory appeals 
is a possible solution that could resolve some of the controversy 
and problems associated with competency tests and Death Row 
Syndrome. 
III. UNITED STATES COMPETENCY TESTS 
Two landmark Supreme Court cases established the tests for 
                                                          
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, http://www.nacdl.org/sl_ 
docs.nsf/A1BF9DDA21904164852566D50069B69C/5568DC0C9137AE7D852
56C3A0052F38B?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
157 Judge Stanton did not know of any similar rulings by trials judges in 
capital cases. DPIC, International Perspective on the Death Penalty: A Costly 
Isolation of the U.S., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45 
&did=536 (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
158 Judge Stanton also suggested that the United States “be well advised to 
join most of the civilized countries of the world in abolishing the death penalty.” 
Id. 
159 Id. See also Kindler No. 470/1991, reported at 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 307. 
160 Jones, 740 So. 2d at 524. See also DPIC, International Perspective on 
the Death Penalty, supra note 64, citing Hanley, supra note 149. 
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waiving appeal in a death penalty case. Rees v. Peyton161 
established the competency test for death penalty cases and 
Whitmore v. Arkansas162 created the requirements for “next friend” 
status.163 In combination, these decisions arguably create a loose 
standard by which a court can prolong the appeals process in a 
death penalty case. On the other hand, under the standards created 
by these decisions, courts may still allow incompetent inmates to 
waive appeals.164 
A. Brief History of Competency in Death Penalty Cases 
Under the English Common Law, the mentally incompetent 
were not executed.165 The reasons for the rule are less concrete 
than the rule itself, but one explanation is that the execution of a 
mentally incompetent person offends humanity.166 Another 
explanation is that that the execution of the mentally incompetent 
does little, if anything, to  deter others.167 As Sir Edward Coke 
wrote in 1680, “by intendment of Law the execution of the 
offender is for example . . . but so it is not when a mad man is 
executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against Law, 
and of extream (sic) inhumanity and cruelty. And can be no 
example to others.”168 Other bases for the rule included religious 
underpinnings, and the theory that madness is its own 
punishment.169 
                                                          
161 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (establishing the test for deciding an inmate’s 
competence to waive appeal of a death penalty sentence). 
162 495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
163 “Next friend” status refers to the ability to further an appeal of habeas 
corpus proceeding on behalf of one who is incompetent to do so on their own. 
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149; Rees, 384 U.S. at 312. 
164 See Rees, 384 U.S. at 312. See also Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149. 
165 Kimberley S. Ackerson et al., Judges’ and Psychologists’ Assessments 
of Legal and Clinical Factors in Competence for Execution, 11 PSYCH. PUB. 
POL. AND L. 164, 165 (2005). 
166 Ford, 477 U.S. at 407. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. (quoting E. COKE, 3 INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)). 
169 Id. 
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At its founding, the United States embraced this ideology by 
excluding the mentally incompetent from execution on the basis of 
religious, humane, and societal reasons,170 but the Supreme Court 
did not address the constitutionality of the issue until 1986, in Ford 
v. Wainwright.171 Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death for shooting a police officer three times in the 
course of robbing a Red Lobster restaurant in Florida.172 After 
approximately six years in prison,173 Ford developed signs of 
serious mental disorders, which were later diagnosed by 
psychiatrist Jamal Amin, on the basis of 14 months of evaluation, 
as resembling “paranoid schizophrenia with suicide potential.”174 
Ford filed a habeas corpus petition seeking an evidentiary hearing, 
which the federal district court denied. The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the denial.175 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve 
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the 
insane176 and, if so, whether the District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida should have held a hearing on petitioner’s 
claim.177  The Court found that the common law rationales for 
prohibiting the execution of the insane were still relevant, and 
questioned the retributive value of executing an insane person:178 
The natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one 
who has no capacity to come to grips with his own 
conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the intuiting 
that such an execution simply offends humanity is 
                                                          
170 Ford, 477 U.S. at 399 (where the court found execution of the insane 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 
171 477 U.S. 399, 429-30 (1986). 
172 Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 1979). 
173 Ford, 477 U.S. at 402-03. 
174 Id. at 403. The governor of Florida signed petitioner’s death warrant 
after soliciting reports from a panel of psychiatrists who deemed Ford 
competent. Id. at 404. 
175 Id. 
176 For the purposes of this Note, the terms “insane” and “mentally 
incompetent” shall be synonymous and used interchangeably. 
177 Id. at 409-10. 
178 Id. at 409. 
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evidently shared across this nation. Faced with such 
widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign power, 
this Court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence 
of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be 
to protect the condemned from fear and pain without 
comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of 
society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless 
vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth 
Amendment.179 
The Court held that the execution of the insane is “cruel and 
unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.180 
Accordingly, Ford thus required psychological evaluations for 
death row inmates with questionable mental conditions.181 The 
Court held that when questions of competency for execution were 
raised, due process entitled the defendant to an evidentiary 
hearing.182 However, the Court failed to specify the fact-finding 
procedures necessary for a determination of competency to be 
executed.183 As the next section will illustrate, this vague mandate 
complicates the issue of competency in voluntary death cases, in 
part because Rees only requires a capacity to make a rational 
choice, and does not scrutinize an inmate’s impetus for waiving 
appeal. 
B. Competency in “Volunteer” Cases: The Principles of Rees 
v. Peyton 
Some legal scholars have argued that anyone who chooses to 
                                                          
179 Id. 
180 Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
181 Ackerson, supra note 21, at 164. 
182 Id. 
183 Only Justice Powell, in his concurrence, addressed the legal test for 
competency for execution, and stated that the Eighth Amendment “forbids the 
execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to 
suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 2608 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
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waive appeals and submit to execution is incompetent.184 While the 
Supreme Court has rejected a per se rule of incompetency for 
defendants who wish to waive their appeals,185 it has found 
inmates incompetent to volunteer on an ad hoc basis, and laid out 
its standard for doing so in Rees v. Peyton.186 
In 1961, Melvin Davis Rees Jr. was convicted of murdering 
three family members and sentenced to death by a state court in 
Virginia.187 The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 1962.188 
Thereafter, a habeas corpus petition was filed in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the 
state court conviction had violated Rees’s federal constitutional 
rights.189 The District Court rejected these claims, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.190 
Rees next filed a petition for certiorari to have the Supreme 
Court review the Fourth Circuit’s decision on June 23, 1965.191 
However, one month later, Rees directed his counsel to withdraw 
the petition and forgo any further legal proceedings.192 In a letter to 
his counsel on July 18, 1965, Rees wrote: 
It is my mature & considered decision to withdraw from 
before the U.S. Supreme Ct., as well as from all further 
consideration, the petition you recently filed, & that Mr. 
Crismond, the clerk of Spotsylvania county ct. be notified 
that all legal proceedings have been abandoned.193 
                                                          
184 Richard C. Dieter, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect 
Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799  n. 115, 813 n.100 (1990). 
185 Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that anyone who chooses to 
waive appeal and elect execution is incompetent. Rehnquist suggested that 
sometimes the preservation of one’s own life is not the “highest good.” Lenhard 
v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312-13 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). 
186 384 U.S. 312, 312 (1966). 
187 Rees v. Commonwealth, 127 S.E.2d 406 (Va. 1962). 
188 Id. 
189 Rees v. Peyton, 225 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Va. 1964). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Petitioner’s counsel advised the court that since evidence cast doubt on 
his client’s mental competency he could not conscientiously do so without a 
psychiatric evaluation of petitioner. Id. 
193 The letter went on to say: 
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court heard Rees’ case on the issue of 
waiving appeal, and on May 13, 1966, the Supreme Court 
remanded Rees’s case to the district court and defined competency 
for execution and how that competency is to be determined.194 
Under Rees, to declare competency, the lower court must find that 
the inmate has the “capacity to understand his position” and “make 
a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further 
litigation.”195 On the other hand, if the lower court finds that the 
inmate instead suffers from some type of mental illness that 
substantially affects his or her capacity to make such a choice, the 
inmate’s competency to waive appeal is called into question.196 
                                                          
In Dostoyevski’s novel “The Bros. Karamozov” Father Zossimas [sic] 
elder Brother lay dying, sick & handicapped in many ways but there 
was joy in His heart & to those that attended him he asked how it was 
that we could go on holding grudges against one another & always 
trying to out do one another when we could be entering the Garden in a 
Spirit of Love & Friendliness & brotherhood to live a new & happy life 
in the Name of Jesus Christ. 
Phyllis L. Crocker, Not to Decide is to Decide: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Thirty-Year Struggle with One Case About Competency to Waive Death Penalty 
Appeals, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 893 (2004). A transcript of Rees’s note was 
found, verbatim, in a letter Rees’s attorney wrote to John F. Davis, the clerk of 
the court. Id. at 892. Rees’s lawyer included other evidence of Rees’s mental 
state in his letter. He noted that in 1960, Rees’s competence to stand trial on the 
federal charges had been questioned. Although the federal district court found 
Rees competent to stand trial, psychological evaluations noted that Rees’s 
“‘judgment is relatively poor with respect both to grasp of conventional ideas 
and to independent action,’ and that at times ‘his distinction between fact and 
fantasy is poorly maintained and unrealistic ideas and actions are likely to be 
numerous.’” Id. at 893 (quoting the letter). 
194 The Court did not make a decision on the inmate’s competency but 
rather determined that in aid of the proper exercise of the Supreme Court’s 
certiorari jurisdiction, the Federal District Court in which the proceeding 
commenced should make a judicial determination as to Rees’s mental 
competence and then render a report back to the Supreme Court. Rees, 384 U.S. 
at 314. 
195 Id. The analysis is done at the time the inmate “volunteers.” This test 
does not take into account his condition when he perpetrated the crimes. Id. at 
908. See also Rees, 384 U.S. at 314. 
196 Id. After laying out this standard, the court remanded the case to Judge 
Oren R. Lewis, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
BLANK MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:35 PM 
766 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
This test has both cognitive and volitional aspects.197 
This test highlights the uncertain relationship between mental 
illness and rational choice.198 The test asked if Rees was “suffering 
from a mental disease, disorder or defect that may substantially 
affect his capacity.”199 The imprecise nature of mental illness 
leaves open the possibility that Rees could have been mentally ill 
in a way that did not affect his judgment. At the same time, Rees 
could have been found incompetent even if a firm correlation could 
not be found. 
The standard set forth in Rees is a difficult one because the two 
alternative findings mentioned by the Court are not mutually 
exclusive; a person with a mental disorder that “affects” his 
decision-making could still make a rational choice, and 
unequivocal cases of irrationality rarely arise.200 For instance, in 
People v. Haynes, the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and 
instructed his attorney to forgo appeals because he believed that 
the future of civilization depended upon his death.201 This is a 
unique case because the choice to waive appeal is clearly the result 
                                                          
Virginia, in July 1966. The Judge ascertained that Rees understood the likely 
consequence of withdrawing his petition, but Rees’s response was insufficient to 
conclude that he was competent to waive his appeal. Judge Lewis concluded that 
Rees should be examined at the federal medical center in Springfield, Missouri, 
and over the next three months, a team of doctors evaluated Rees at the 
Springfield facility. Four doctors who examined him testified at an evidentiary 
hearing to determine Rees’s competence in October of 1966. The four doctors 
deemed Rees incompetent to withdraw his petition for writ of certiorari. On 
January 12, 1967 Judge Lewis filed his report on Rees’s mental competence 
with the Supreme Court. He concluded, “ Melvin Davis Rees, Jr. cannot at this 
time make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further 
litigation in his behalf. He is suffering from a major mental disorder, 
schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type, affecting his capacity in 
the premises.” Crocker, supra note 192, at 909-14. 
197 See supra note 195. 
198 Id. 
199 Rees, 384 U.S. at 313. 
200 Richard J. Bonnie, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness: Mentally Ill 
Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 
CATH. U.L. REV. 1169, 1186 (2005). 
201 737 N.E. 2d 169, 178 (Ill. 2000). 
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of a mental delusion.202 However, the more typical case involves 
articulated reasons that may seem “rational” under the 
circumstances, including: a desire to take responsibility for one’s 
actions, a belief that one deserves the death penalty, or a 
preference for the death penalty over life imprisonment.203 In many 
cases, “rational” choices may be rooted in suicidal motivations and 
it is up to a judge to weigh the facts of the specific case and 
identify the prevailing motivation.204 If the judge does find 
incompetence, then a third party may be able to continue the 
appeal on the inmate’s behalf. 205 
C. Standing to Appeal on the Defendant’s Behalf: “Next 
Friend” Status and the Principles of Whitmore v. 
Arkansas 
An important issue in many volunteer cases is determining who 
may further appeal on behalf of an incompetent inmate.206 “Next 
friend standing” allows an interested party to continue an appeal on 
behalf of the inmate.207 In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the Court 
determined whether a third party has standing to challenge the 
validity of a death sentence imposed on a capital defendant who 
has elected to forgo his right of appeal to the state’s highest 
court.208 
On December 28, 1987, Ronald Gene Simmons shot and killed 
two people and wounded three others in the course of a rampage 
through the town of Russellville, Arkansas.209 After police 
apprehended Simmons, they searched his home in nearby Dover, 
Arkansas and discovered the bodies of fourteen members of his 
family, all of whom had been murdered.210 
                                                          
202 Id. 
203 Bonnie, supra note 200, at 1187. 
204 Id. 
205 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 195. 
206 Id. 
207 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. 
208 Id. at 151. 
209 Id at 151-52. 
210 Id. 
BLANK MACROED CORRECTED 7-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:35 PM 
768 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
After being tried and convicted of capital murder and 
sentenced to death,211 Simmons stated under oath: “I, Ronald Gene 
Simmons, Sr., want it to be known that it is my wish and my desire 
that absolutely no action by anybody be taken to appeal or in any 
way change this sentence.”212 Upon a competency hearing and 
application of the Rees test, the court concluded that Simmons’s 
decision was knowing and intelligent.213 
Jonas Whitmore, another inmate on death row, petitioned the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas to claim standing on Simmons’s 
behalf or that, in the alternative, he qualified as next friend in 
furthering Simmons’s appeal.214 After quickly dismissing the 
standing argument, the Supreme Court presented considerable 
discussion on the history and procedure of “next friend” status.215 
As an alternative basis for standing to maintain this action the 
petitioner tried to proceed as “next friend of Ronald Gene 
Simmons.”216 Next friend status is most often requested on behalf 
of detained prisoners who are unable, usually due to mental 
                                                          
211 Simmons was first tried for the Russelville crimes, and a jury convicted 
him of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Id at 152. 
212 He further stated that he requested the sentence be carried out 
expeditiously. Id. 
213 The state subsequently tried Simmons for the murder of his fourteen 
family members and on February 10, 1989, a jury convicted him of capital 
murder and imposed a sentence of death by lethal injection. Simmons again 
notified the trial court of his desire to waive his right to direct appeal. After a 
hearing, the court found Simmons competent to do so. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 
153. 
214 Whitmore was an inmate who had already been convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death, had exhausted his direct appellate review and had been 
denied state post-conviction relief. Id. at 156. 
215 Whitmore’s principal claim of injury in fact was that Arkansas has 
established a system of comparative review in death penalty cases, and that he 
had “a direct and substantial interest in having the data base against which his 
crime is compared to be complete and to not be arbitrarily skewed by omission 
of any other capital case.” He argued that the precedent set by hearing Simmon’s 
appeal may benefit his own cause. The Court found this alleged injury too 
speculative. Even if petitioner could show that he would be retried, convicted, 
and sentenced, petitioner had not shown that Simmons’ convictions would be 
pertinent to his proportionality review in the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Id. 
216 Id. at 161-62. 
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incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves.217 A 
next friend does not himself become a party to a habeas corpus 
action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on 
behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in 
interest.218 
The Supreme Court made explicit that next friend standing is 
not granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action 
on behalf of another.219 The Court determined two prerequisites for 
next friend standing.220 First, a next friend “must provide an 
adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental 
incompetence, or other disability—as to why the real party cannot 
appear on his own behalf.”221 This prerequisite is not satisfied 
where an evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed, 
and his access to court is otherwise unimpeded.222 
Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best 
interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate.223 The 
court suggests that a next friend must have some significant 
relationship with the real party in interest.224 The burden is on the 
                                                          
217 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 (1955) 
(prisoner’s sister brought habeas corpus proceeding while he was being held in 
Korea). Some courts have additionally permitted “next friends” to prosecute 
actions outside the habeas corpus context on behalf of infants, other minors, and 
adult mental incompetents. See also Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379, 380 
(1874) (“next friend” may bring action for divorce on behalf of an insane 
person); Blumentahl v. Craig, 81 F. 320, 321-22 (CA3 1897) (“next friend” was 
admitted by court to prosecute personal injury action on behalf of the plaintiff, 
who was a minor). 
218 McClellan, supra note 15, at 229-31. 
219 Id. 
220 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161. 
221 Id. at 163-64. 
222 Id. at 165. 
223 Id. at 163. 
224 Id. See also Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (N.D. Ga. 1980) 
(denying “next friend” standing to a minister and first cousin of prisoner 
because, other than being philosophically and religiously opposed to the death 
penalty, the minister and first cousin demonstrated little in the way of interest as 
next friend). 
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next friend to clearly establish the propriety of his or her status and 
justify the jurisdiction of the court by showing that he or she is not 
an intruder or uninvited meddler.225 
The policy underlying these limitations is to prevent strangers 
to the action from circumventing the restrictions of traditional 
standing by claiming to be “next friends.”226 Once incompetency is 
established the court only requires that the next friend be dedicated 
to the best interests of the inmate.227 
In Ross, the court used the Rees test to find competence and 
avoided the issue of next friend standing.228 The application of this 
test in the Ross case allowed a finding of competency without 
adequately addressing the testimony of Ross’s supporters and 
inquiring into Ross’s possible motivation for waiving appeal. The 
possible existence of Death Row Syndrome exposes problems with 
the efficiency and reliability of the Rees and Whitmore tests, which 
may be solved through nonwaivable mandatory appeals. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION: MANDATORY APPEAL 
One way to eradicate many of the discrepancies and 
controversies that accompany the use of the Rees and Whitmore 
tests, in light of the Court’s recent willingness to look toward the 
guidance of international courts in Ropper, is to institute 
mandatory, non-waivable appeals in death penalty cases.229 Some 
states have interpreted Faretta v. California as creating a right to 
waive appeal.230 In response, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
instituted nonwaivable mandatory appeals, which could solve the 
problems associated with Death Row Syndrome and the Rees and 
Whitmore tests. 
                                                          
225 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. 
226 Id. at 178. 
227 Id. at 177. 
228 See infra Part I. 
229 Rees, 384 U.S. 312; Whitmore, 495 U.S. 173. 
230 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (where the court allowed an 
inmate to control his own defense and waive assistance of counsel). 
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A. Faretta v. California 
The Supreme Court has not decided a case on the issue of 
volunteering for execution, but some Supreme Court Justices have 
favored mandatory appeal as a way to ensure the efficiency and 
fairness of a death penalty conviction.231 In Whitmore, Justice 
Marshall stated that “a defendant’s voluntary submission to a 
barbaric punishment does not ameliorate the harm that imposing 
such a punishment causes to our basic societal values and to the 
integrity of our system of justice.”232 
In the absence of a clear opinion, some state courts have 
interpreted Faretta v. California233 as establishing a capital 
defendant’s constitutional right to waive the presentation of 
mitigating evidence at sentencing.234 In Faretta, Anthony Faretta 
attempted to waive assistance of counsel, but the trial court 
appointed a public defender. The trial court found that Faretta had 
not intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel, and 
had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense.235 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state could not 
constitutionally force a lawyer upon a petitioner who voluntarily 
exercised his informed free will.236 
The Faretta Court recognized a right to self-representation 
under the Sixth Amendment and found that the trial court was 
barred from interfering with the accused’s right to present a 
defense in his own fashion.237 Farretta had a constitutional right to 
proceed without counsel because States cannot “force a lawyer” 
                                                          
231 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 173 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Casey, supra note 
8, at 86. 
232 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 173 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
233 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806. 
234 Some courts allowing Faretta to be used to not present mitigating 
evidence, which amounts to offering no defense. Extrapolated, some have 
argued that this allows an inmate not to present a defense at all, thus letting them 
waive appeals. Casey, supra note 8, at 82-83. 
235 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808-10. 
236 Id. at 835-36. 
237 Id. at 819. 
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upon a defendant.238 However, arguably, Faretta only stands for 
the requirement that nothing interfere with the defendant’s right to 
present his or her own defense; it does not establish an inmate’s 
right to waive appeal.239 
B. New Jersey: Mandatory Non-Waivable Appeals 
Presently, only New Jersey has non-waivable appeals in all 
aspects of death penalty cases.240 The New Jersey approach to 
mandatory appeals imposes, through judicial decision, a non-
waivable application for post-conviction relief and the presentation 
of mitigating evidence.241 In New Jersey v. Martini, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court concluded that certain important issues were 
better raised on application for post- conviction relief and not on 
appeal.242 Thereafter, the court ordered that counsel be appointed 
for capital defendants who did not wish to pursue post-conviction 
relief and that the defendant must present some type of mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing part of the death penalty proceeding.243 
These requirements are unwaivable.244 
The New Jersey approach is based upon a narrow interpretation 
of Faretta. Because the Supreme Court has yet to issue a decision 
dealing directly with the problem of volunteering for execution, 
some state courts have broadly interpreted Faretta as creating an 
                                                          
238 Id. at 807. 
239 See Casey, supra note 8, at 83. 
240 Id. at 87. 
241 Id. 
242 State v. Martini, 144 A.2d 1106, 1112-13 (N.J. 1996). 
243 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that there “must be an 
end to the process” at some point and thus required an expedited procedure for 
the consideration of post-conviction relief applications when the capital 
defendant is opposed to the application. Id. The Supreme Court established that 
the capital sentencer must consider and weigh mitigating evidence when 
deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death. The result is that during a 
capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution presents evidence showing 
aggravating factors and the defendant is allowed to present evidence of 
mitigating factors. Id. at 1112. 
244 Id. 
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inmate’s right to waive appeal.245 For example, the Florida 
Supreme Court relied on Faretta for the proposition that a trial 
court could not appoint outside counsel to argue against the death 
penalty because under the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation “all competent defendants have a right to control 
their own destinies.”246 These courts have extended the “right to 
representation” to stand for the decision to refuse representation.247 
New Jersey has been able to constitutionally justify 
implementing nonwaivable mandatory appeals by narrowly 
interpreting Faretta to stand only for the proposition that a 
defendant can represent himself, not that a defendant can waive a 
defense all together.248 In Faretta, the Court relied on the Sixth 
Amendment to find that a defendant had a right to represent 
himself and that the state could not interfere with the personal 
defense of the defendant.249 Faretta never contemplated a 
defendant waiving his defense all together.250 If the defendant 
raises no defense, then arguably the Sixth Amendment is not 
implicated.251 Therefore, there would be no constitutional right 
prohibiting courts from imposing mandatory, nonwaivable appeals 
                                                          
245 Casey, supra note 8, at 82-83. 
246 Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1998) (where William 
Hamblen was indicted for first degree murder and allowed to represent himself 
and waive his right to have a jury consider whether he should be executed) as 
quoted in Casey, supra note 8, at 86. 
247 The Sixth Amendment provides that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also, John R. Mitchell, Attorneys Representing 
Death Row Clients: Client Autonomy Over Personal Opinions, 25 CAP. U.L. 
REV. 643, 652 (1996). 
248 Casey, supra note 8, at 87. 
249 See generally Faretta, 422 U.S. 806. 
250 Id. 
251 Casey, supra note 8, at 85. 
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in death penalty cases.252 
New Jersey’s nonwaivable appeals are further supported by 
two other principles. The first is derived from Furman: procedural 
waivers undermine the state’s important responsibility for 
maintaining the consistent and appropriate application of the death 
penalty.253 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that for a death 
sentence to be constitutional, the Eighth Amendment requires that 
the sentence be imposed in a non-arbitrary manner.254 This 
guarantees to society at large that the integrity of the criminal 
justice system will be maintained.255 Therefore, a defendant cannot 
waive appeal, and allow the state to impose a punishment that 
would otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment.256 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s other consideration was the 
state’s interest in restricting the risk of state-sponsored executions. 
This risk outweighs the interest of any single defendant to control 
his or her own fate.257 This argument is once again founded in a 
state’s interest in a non-arbitrary death penalty.258 The state takes 
the position that allowing a defendant’s possible death wish to 
determine if an execution occurs undermines a non-arbitrary death 
penalty. A death sentence applied appropriately and consistently 
cannot take into account a defendant’s death wish, but rather only 
focus on the justness and fairness of the execution.259 
C. New Jersey, Death Row Syndrome, and the Ross Case 
New Jersey has now stayed all executions via a moratorium,260 
                                                          
252 State v. Martini, 144 N.J. 603, 617 (N.J. 1996). See also Casey, supra 
note 8, at 64. 
253 Casey, supra note 8, at 94. 
254 Furman, 408 U.S. at 242. 
255 Martini, 144 N.J. at 617. See also Casey, supra note 8, at 95. 
256 Martini, 144 N.J. at 617. See also Casey, supra note 8, at 95. 
257 Casey supra note 8, at 95. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 96. 
260 2005 N.J. ALS 321. New Jersey passed a one year moratorium on the 
death penalty while it considers abolishing the death penalty altogether. The 
moratorium began in January 2006. Id. Although 10 people are on New Jersey’s 
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so there will be no experience with non-waivable appeals for other 
states to draw upon. Nonetheless, the analysis conducted by the 
New Jersey courts is relevant to determining the effect of 
mandatory nonwaivable appeals on the emergence of Death Row 
Syndrome and how the syndrome affects how a state balances its 
interest in maintaining a non-arbitrary death penalty with an 
inmate’s interest in controlling his own destiny. By considering 
how mandatory nonwaivable appeals would have affected the Ross 
decision, the hypothetical shows how mandatory nonwaivable 
appeals would virtually eliminate the dangers inherent with Death 
Row Syndrome. 
The argument against mandatory nonwaivable appeals in light 
of the emergence of Death Row Syndrome is that mandatory 
nonwaivable appeals could actually lead to more cases of Death 
Row Syndrome.261 Arguably, nonwaivable mandatory appeals 
would sufficiently lengthen the judicial process and the amount of 
time an inmate spends on death row. This could increase the 
chance of Death Row Syndrome and possibly create a cyclical and 
inefficient death penalty system.262 Furthermore, these new 
procedures would substantially increase the cost to the state not 
only through the added appeals but also from the cost of caring for 
inmates who became incompetent while awaiting execution. 
Proponents of mandatory appeals argue that the appeals would 
streamline litigation, and create a faster and more efficient death 
penalty. As illustrative from the Ross case, part of the reason for 
the long delay was the ancillary litigation that arose from friends, 
family and supporters once Ross elected to waive appeal.263 This 
litigation was costly and added to the anguish of the victims, 
supporters, and all involved, and could have been significantly 
reduced if there were nonwaivable mandatory appeals. The 
nonwaivable mandatory appeals would create a finite number of 
court appearances and steps in order to concentrate the energies of 
                                                          
death row, it has been 43 years since the last execution. Barbara S. Rothschild, 
8th Limits Punishment, Bail, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, New Jersey) Mar. 1, 
2006. 
261 DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. 
262 Id. 
263 See infra Part II. 
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the court and resources of all the parties involved. While some 
cases in which inmates waive appeals at early stages will be made 
longer, this system would have reduced the amount of time Ross 
spent fighting the court system. 
Proponents of mandatory appeals also argue that without 
mandatory appeals, given the existence of Death Row Syndrome, a 
state’s interest in maintaining a non-arbitrary death penalty may be 
hindered. Arguably, the existence of Death Row Syndrome 
encourages courts to expedite executions to prevent further inmates 
from developing Death Row Syndrome. An expedited death 
penalty would undermine the reason for the appeals process in the 
first place and threaten the efficiency and arbitrariness of the death 
penalty.264 Mandatory appeals ensure a uniform process and 
prevent courts from expediting sentences in order to prevent new 
cases of Death Row Syndrome. 
The risk of an inmate developing Death Row Syndrome must 
be weighed against the possibility of executing an innocent person. 
Allowing inmates to waive their mandatory review of death 
penalty convictions jeopardizes the validity and efficiency of a 
conviction.265 There are many instances in which defendants waive 
appeal not because of a calculated decision, but because of a 
mental illness or Death Row Syndrome.266 For example, Isidore 
Zimmerman attempted to expedite his death sentence even though 
he was innocent. The psychological torture of being on death row 
pushed him to pursue death. However, immediately prior to his 
execution he was exonerated.267 
Many of the complications in the Ross case due to Death Row 
Syndrome would have never arisen had there been mandatory 
nonwaivable appeals because the process ensures that every 
precaution has been taken.268 In Ross, the courts did not adequately 
                                                          
264 DPIC, Time on Death Row, supra note 12. 
265 Sara L. Golden, Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act: Is 
the Lack of Mandatory Appeal Really Meaningful Appeal?, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 
429, 430, 442 (2001). 
266 See supra Part I. 
267 Strafer, supra note 8, at 869 as found in McClellan, supra note 15, at 
211. 
268 Golden, supra note 218, at 467-68. 
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contemplate and examine Ross’s underlying motivation for 
waiving appeal. The New Jersey approach to mandatory 
nonwaivable appeals would contemplate the existence of Death 
Row Syndrome in every volunteer and prevent an inmate from 
expediting the death penalty process. While the longer appeals 
process may result in more reported cases of Death Row Syndrome 
and increased costs, the mandatory nonwaivable appeals eliminates 
the risk of killing an innocent person who developed Death Row 
Syndrome and helps ensure a non-arbitrary death penalty.269 
CONCLUSION 
On May 14, 2005, Michael Ross was put to death, ending 20 
years of litigation. Ross was a rapist and murderer, and in the eyes 
of some, may have rightfully been put to death. However, the 
process by which he was ultimately executed is riddled with 
problems and inconsistencies. 
There is a very thin line between state-sponsored executions 
and state-assisted suicide. States are forced to weigh the state 
interest in preventing suicide and maintaining the consistent and 
appropriate application of the death penalty with an inmate’s 
interest in controlling his own destiny. In the wake of 
acknowledgment and identification of the adverse affects of living 
on death row for extended periods by international courts, United 
States Supreme Court Justices, and the New Jersey and Florida 
state courts, the Supreme Court of the United States should pay 
more heed to the possibility of Death Row Syndrome and more 
fully scrutinize Ross’s motivation for waiving appeal. 
Following New Jersey’s lead, the adoption of non-waivable 
mandatory appeals would presume Death Row Syndrome in every 
inmate and eliminate the controversy and inconsistencies that 
accompany the Rees and Whitmore tests.270 This would ensure 
efficiency and uniformity to an already convoluted and 
controversial issue. 
 
                                                          
269 Id. 
270 See supra Part II. 
